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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)Q). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
ISSUE: As described in the Brief of Appellant Sean Kendall ("Kendall") ("App. 
Brief'), at 1, the issue in this appeal is as follows: 
Do the discriminatory and excessively burdensome attorneys' fee and costs 
bond requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-104 ("the Bond Statute") 
and the discriminatory costs undertaking requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-60 I ("the Undertaking Statute") violate the equal protection, 
freedom to petition, and due process guarantees of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions, and the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution, 
both facially and as applied to Appellant Sean Kendall ("Kendall")? 
This Supplemental Brief is being filed, pursuant to the Supplemental Briefing Order of 
the Utah Supreme Court dated December 22, 2016, because ''the posture before the 
Supreme Court creates a material difference in the argument presented." (Supplemental 
Briefing Order, at 1.) Specifically relating to the issue presented is the question of 
whether Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981), the case primarily relied upon by 
\JJ Appellees ( collectively "the City") and the trial court, should be overruled because it 
baselessly manufactured a means of avoiding the serious constitutional defects in the 
statute under consideration and arrived at the wrong conclusion, after applying the 
incorrect standards ( or no standards at all), regarding the facial unconstitutionality of the 
bond statute there under consideration. The Utah Supreme Court is in a position to 
overrule the poorly reasoned, unprincipled decision in Zamora, which has generated 
I 
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tremendous injustice over the years. The Utah Court of Appeals would not have had the 
capacity to overrule Zamora. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[T]he constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law to be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court," as noted in 
App. Brief, at 1. Further, in cases asserting a violation of article I, section 11 ("the Open 
Courts Clause") of the Utah Constitution, a majority of the Utah Supreme Court has 
refused to presume the constitutionality of a statute alleged to deprive a party of access to 
the courts or to a remedy. As a majority of the Utah Supreme Court noted, "this court has 
consistently rejected the presumption of constitutionality of statutes challenged under the 
remedies clause of article I, section 11." Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, 
1 50, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (writing for a majority of the Court).1 See 
also Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("because [the 
statute under review] impacts . . . a civil remedy . . . protected under Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution, the usual presumption of validity does not control our review of 
1 Appellant's Reply Brief, at 24, cites to 1 8 of Wood as indicating that the "Utah 
Supreme Court rejected a blanket application of heightened scrutiny to every challenge 
under Article I, section 1 l." That was, regrettably, an erroneous reading of the authority 
of ,I 8 of Wood. As Chief Justice Durham's dissent makes clear, the statement regarding 
the standard of review in the lead opinion is a minority view, departing from the Utah 
Supreme Court's "carefully crafted and long relied-on analytic model in article I, section 
11 cases." Wood, 2002 UT 134, ,I 43, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (writing for 
a majority of the Court). As is made clear in Wood, the "majority view" is that there 
should be a "heightened level of scrutiny" and a continued rejection of the "presumption 
of constitutionality" where significant constitutional rights are claimed to have been 
abrogated by a statute. Id. 
2 
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this statute").2 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: Kendall has identified in the Brief 
of Appellant, at 2, the abundant record of Kendall's preservation of the primary issue on 
appeal. Rcforcnccs to the specific issue relating t.o t.he continued viability and 
applicability of Zamora., and the centrality of Zamora to the arguments of the City, as 
well as to the decision of the trial court that the Bond and Undertaking Statutes (Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-104 and 63G-7 601, respectively) are constitutional, are found 
throughout the proceedings below. 3 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
ZAMORA HAS CAUSED THE DEPRIVATION OF ACCESS, 
AND EXCESSIVE DELAYS IN GAINING ACCESS, TO 
UTAH STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS. 
KendaII has experienced tremendous delay, expense, and discriminatory treatment 
in this matter (see App. Brief, at 33-34) as a result of the reliance on Zamora by the City 
and the trial court. Counsel for the City argued before the trial court as follows: 
2 The trial comt erroneously applied a presumption of constitutionality to the Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes challenged by Kendall, as follows: 
Further, it is well settled that a statute "is presumed constitutional, and [that 
a court will] resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality." 
(Quoting Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, 111, 116 P.3d 
295.) 
R. 550. Tindley incorrectly applied the general standard of review, which had theretofore 
consistently heen r~j ected in cases involving Open Courts Clause challenges to statutes, 
citing as authority only Utah Sch. Bds. Ass 'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ii 9, 17 
P.3d 1125, a case that did not involve an open courts challenge nor any claim under 
article I of the Utah Constitution. 
3 See, e.g., R. 194-201; 325-37; 342--43; 375; 442; 546; 550-51; 646-50; 652-54; 780-
84; 785-88. 
3 
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This Court is required to find the bond and undertaking statutes 
constitutional. . . . [T]he Utah Supreme Court has already held the bond 
statute is constitutional. 
R. 325 (citing Zamora and S,i;yder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984)). 
Until and unless Plaintiff satisfies "the substantial burden" of convincing 
the Utah Supreme Court that its decisions in those cases were wrong, the 
decisions in Zamora and Snyder are binding on this Court and the decisions 
from other states are unavailing. 
R. 322. 
'111e trial court, failing to engage in any due process, equal protection, open courts, 
or freedom-to-petition analysis, relied almost entirely (and blindly) on Zamora in ruling 
that the Bond and Undertaking Statutes are constitutional, stating as follows: 
In the instant, the Utah Supreme Court has already held the bond statute is 
constitutional. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80-82 (Utah 1981) (holding 
prior bond statute with substantially the same language constitutional in the 
ordinary and usual circumstances); Snyder v. Cook, 688 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1984) (same) .... Moreover, like the bond statute, the undertaking statute 
contains the same language that the "sum be fixed by the court" that the 
Court in Zamora found important and gave courts flexibility to determine 
whether the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to a particular 
plaintiff. 
R. 550-51.4 
A bare citation to Zamora ( or one of the cases that have blindly followed Zamora 
m its destructive wake) seems to simply lull the courts-state and federal-into a 
slumberous failure to analyze the glaring constitutional defects of the Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes. See, e.g., Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576, 577-578 (10th 
Cir. 1991) ( citing Snyder and Zamora, without any analysis, the court simply stated 
"Lik~wis~, in Snyder, 688 P.2d at 498, this Cowt engaged in no constitutional analysis 
and relied solely on Zamora. Because plaintiffs did not "contend that they are 
impecunious or unable to furnish the bond," the Court upheld the bond simply because 
"[i]n Zamora this Court held that the statute requiring an undertaking was constitutional 
and served the public interest." Id. 
4 
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"[s]ection 78-11-10 has been upheld as constitutional."); Mglej v. Garfield Co., 2014 
~ WL 2967605, Case No. 2:13-cv-713, *2 (D. Utah, July 1, 2015) (without any mention of 
a constitutional issue, the court concluded, citing Rippstein, that plaintiffs "failure to 
post an undertaking and bond necessitates dismissal"); Webecke v. Salt Lake Ctty, Case 
No. 2: 13-cv-1132, at 2 (D. Utah, April 22, 2015) (without any reference to any 
constitutional issue, and citing Rippstein, the court held that "[b ]ecause Plaintiff failed to 
file the required undertaking and bond at the time the Complaint was filed, Defendants 
Motion to Dismiss ... must be granted."); Webb v. Scott, 20 I 5 WL 1257513, Case No. 
1:ll-cv-128, at *14 (D. Utah Mar. 18, 2015), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 2183124 
(D. Utah May 8, 2015}, affd. in part, rev 'din part, on other grounds, and remanded, 643 
.Fed.Appx. 711 (10th Cir. 2016) (without any mention of a constitutional issue, the court 
stated: "[g]iven Plaintiff's failure to cite any fact" that he complied with Utah Code Ann. 
§ ... 78B-3-104, he has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on his state law 
'-tiJ claims."). 
The Bond and Undertaking Statutes-and the cases applying them in a manner at 
odds with due process, equal protection, and the constitutional guarantees of access to the 
courts and the right to petition-have had tremendously discriminatory, unjust, and court-
access-chilling effects. Those effects are not found merely in Zamora's repugnant legacy 
of unreasoned case law, but also in the ongoing injustices and denials of access 
frequently faced by victims, indigent and non-indigent alike,5 of wrongdoing by law 
5 
"It is immaterial that a defendant can afford to be deprived of his property, or that other 
means are available to alleviate his situation. Denial of due process affects the rich as 
5 
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enforcement officers whose state law claims remam unvindicated because of the 
oppressive, burdensome, and discriminatory Bond and Undertaking Statutes and because 
they give up when they find justice so elusive, if not impossible, to obtain. See App. 
Brief, at 16-17.6 
One class of tort victims faces a discriminatory and unjust reality: A victim 
seeking justice under state law for an injury caused hy a law enforcement officer learns 
that if he or she is seeking to pursue a state law claim against a law enforcement officer, 
he or she could be bankrupted if the case is lost-even though the case is meritorious-
because of a unique statute, applying only to claims against law enforcement officers, 
that allows an award of attorneys' f ecs and costs against a losing plaintiff 
Then, the victim learns that, unlike any other people who have sutlered injuries at 
the hands of people other than law enforcement officers, he or she must ( 1) before filing 
a Complaint, obtain a determination by a judge (with no legal procedure as to how that is 
to be done) regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs that will be incurred in the 
future by a law enforcement officer sued by the victim and (2) post a bond, before filing a 
Complaint~ in the amount "found" by the court to be the fees and costs that will be 
incurred in the future by the law enforcement officer. 
If the victim-having learned of the tremendously unfair, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory treatment of those who seek justice for violations of state laws by law 
well as the poor." Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 504 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Cal. 1973) (in 
bank). 
6 The filing of a bond for future attorney's fees and costs under § 78B-3-104 "is an 
absolute bar in essence to any constitutional action for most people." R. 744. "They 
finally just shake their heads and say there is no justice and they just walk away." R. 728. 
6 
EL1 
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enforcement officers-is not deterred from seeking access to the courts, it could be only 
~ because (1) the victim has enough resources or is so certain of victory that he or she is not 
concerned about a potential liability of hw1Clreds of thousands of dollars for fees and costs 
in the event the case is lost; (2) the victim has an audaciousness and implacable sense of 
principle that betrays what most would consider economic rationality; or (3) the victim is 
not dissuaded by the prospect of bankrnptcy. 
II. ZAMORA WAS WRONGLY DECIDED AND SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED. 
The Court in Zumura observed that "[i]t is noteworthy that the statute under 
consideration has previously been involved in cases before this Court under differing 
circumstances and has not been declared unconstitutional." A more candid assessment 
VJ) would have heen to say that the statute under consideration had never been declared 
con,·titulional-or that there had never been a ruling either way. The cases cited by the 
Court in Zamora, 635 P.2d. at 80 n.5, purportedly supporting its observation that the 
statute "has not been declared unconstitutional," were Kiesel v. Dist. Court, 96 Utah 156, 
84 P.2d 782 (1938), and Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132 (1941), neither of 
iJ1 which addressed the constitutionality of the bond statute. 7 
Contrary to the mandatory terms of the statute, the Court in Zamora, in an 
unprincipled effort to validate the facially unconstitutional statute, manufactured a 
7 In Kiesel, the Court was concerned only with whether the statute permitted any 
"discretion in the court to permit filing of the undertaking after the motion to dismiss the 
complaint." 84 P.2d at 784. In Wright, the Court found the statute did not apply because 
there was no evidence the defendant had been acting in the course of his duties. In fact, 
the Court explicitly noted that "[t]he constitutionality of the statute cannot be passed on . 
. . " 118 P.2d at 135. 
7 
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"flexibility" for the trial court to take account of "the plaintiff's circumstances," 635 
P .2d at 8. It went so far as to twist the words "in an amount fixed by the court" as 
meaning the trial court could arbitrarily ignore the requirement that the bond be "for the 
payment to the defondant of a11 costs and expenses that may be awarded against such 
plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's foe to be fixed by the court ... " 
Nowhere in Zamora is there any consideration of the court-access deprivations 
and other impacts of the bond requirement on plaintiffs ( or prospective plaintiffs) who 
are not impecunious, nor is there any consideration of the fact that any bond requirement 
in a meritorious case is an unconstitutional taking under the Due Process Clauses of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. Also, Zamora lacks any equal protection analysis. 
It simply mentions that "the statute should b~ so applied as to ... atlbrd[ J all persons 
equal justice under law, and of access to the courts to serve that purpose ... "8 
A. LIKE THE CURRENT BOND AND UNDERTAKING 
STATUTES, THE STATUTE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN 
ZAMORA VIOLATED THE OPEN COURTS AND PETITION 
CLAUSES. 
The very language of the Open Courts Clause establishes the constitutional 
invalidity of the bond statute under consideration in Zamora and the current Bond and 
Undertaking Statutes. Segmentation of the Open Courts Clause and emphases are helpful 
8 The discriminatory classifications within the categories of ( 1) tortfeasors and (2) those 
who seek recovery from tortfeasors and the lack of any fair or reasonable justification for 
those classifications, particularly when access to the courts is at issue, are clearly 
violative of federal and Utah equal protection guarantees. "When persons are similarly 
situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among a 
larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no merit." Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984). See also Brief of Appellant, at 13-29. 
8 
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in understanding the breadth of its protections: 
(1) All courts shall be (2) open, and (3) every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, (4) shall have remedy (5) by 
due course of law, (6) which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; (7) and no person (8) shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, (9) any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Other than chaining the courthouse door, few things could create greater burdens, 
discouragements, and obstacles to seeking civil justice than to enact and enforce a 
discriminatory law that requires those, and only those, who seek accountability from law 
enforcement officers for injuries caused by their violations of rights purportedly protected 
under state law to post a bond ( for which a plaintiff would have to pay a premium and 
provide collateral, R. 527, ,r,r 38-43; 714) in an amount determined by a court, according 
~ to some unknown and unspecified procedure9 and according to pure speculation by a 
judge, who is not capable of reasonably estimating future costs and fees that will be 
incurred by a defendant in a case that has not yet even been filed. R. 738-39 ("It would 
be very speculative .... There's no procedure .... There's no standard .... ") 
There is nothing fair about the bond and undertaking statutes, either during the 
time of Zamora or now. And there is certainly nothing equal about the application of 
9 An experienced civil rights lawyer testified as follows: 
Q: And how does one get into a court for a court's determination before 
you even file the complaint? 
A: I <lon"t know how that would be done except maybe the way you're 
doing it right now. 
Q: Nine months later since we filed --
A: Yeah, nine months later. 
Q: -- the complaint. 
R. 739. 
9 
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those statutes, which create, for one class of potential plaintiffs, such enormous burdens, 
uncertainties, and obstacles to obtaining access to justice through Utah courts. Yet, "[t]he 
clear language of [ article I, section 11] guarantees access to the courts and a judicial 
procedure that is based on fairness and equality." ller,y ex rel. Deny v. Beedz Ain.:raj1 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 10 
The requirement of a bond might be possible for some people to meet, but the real-
world obstrnction to access to the courts created by the requirement is what must be taken 
into account in determining whether the courts are truly "open" to "every person" to 
obtain a remedy "by due course of law" for an injury done to him or her. As this Court 
has noted, the Open Courts Clause "imposes a substantive limitation on the legislature's 
ability to eliminate or unduly restrict causes of action seeking relief for injury to 'person, 
property, or reputation."' Day v. Utah, 1999 UT 46, ,I 37, 980 P.2d 1171 (emphasis 
added). 11 A requirement that a prospective plaintiff obtain-through some unspecified 
procedure and without any standards-a judge's determination as to the amount of 
attorneys' fees and costs that will be incurred in the future by a def end ant in an action not 
yet even filed, then post a bond (with collateral) in that amount (which in this case could 
have been between $30,000 and $750,000 or more, R. 266; 270), is not only an undue 
restriction on a person's access to the courts for justice; it is a definitive roadblock for 
10 As noted in Brief of Appellant, at 29-30, ''the right of access to the courts is an aspect 
of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances," 
requiring strict scrutiny of any restriction. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). 
11 In Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 423-24 (Fla. 1992), the Florida 
Supreme Court recognized that bond statutes "create an impermissible restriction on 
access to the courts." (Emphasis added.) 
10 
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almost everyone who seeks to hold a law enforcement officer accountable for violations 
1$) of state law. 
There being no evidence presented by the City or by the State of Utah 12 supporting 
any purported rationale for the Bond or Undertaking Statutes, they cannot be permitted to 
block access to the courts for remedies for injuries caused by law enforcement officers in 
violation of state law. 
The test to he applied to the abrogation or restriction on access to the comts under 
Utah's Open Courts Clause is as follows: 
First, sect.ion 11 is satisfied if the 1aw provides an injured person an 
effective and rea<;onable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the 
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive 
protection to one's person, property, or reputation .... 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation 
of the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear 
social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680 (citations omitted). 
vJ Utilizing a similar test, 13 the Florida Supreme Court held that a fees and costs bond 
12 The State of Utah participated in the proceedings before the trial court (see, e.g., R. 
650-52) and filed a Brief in this appeal (limited to advocating the constitutionality of the 
Undertaking Statute). 
13 Siegel, 610 So.2d at 423-24. The second part of the test applied in Siegel is stricter than 
this Court's present test. In Siegel the court described the second part of the test as 
requiring "a showing of an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of the 
~ right, and finds that there is no alternative method of meeting such public necessity." Id. 
at 424. In light of the importance of protecting access to the courts, without 
discriminatory, undue restrictions, Kendall urges the adoption of that test by this Court. 
11 
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requirement imposed on anyone who sues medical review board participants does not 
provide a plaintiff with an alternative remedy. Siegel, 610 So.2d at 424-25. 
Similarly, in Utah there is no "alternative remedy" for plaintiffs seeking access to 
courts, without unreasonable, discriminatory, and often prohibitive restrictions, for 
remedies against law enforcement officers who have injured them as a result of the 
violation of state laws. Also, applying the second part of the test adopted by this Court in 
Open Courts Clause challenges, there has been no showing whatsoever of "a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated," or, even if there were such an established evil, that 
the restrictions to access-which will often result in the complete elimination of a 
remedy-are not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of achieving the objective. 
A bond requirement may deter some frivolous cases, but it also deters meritorious 
cases. It also allows those who are willing and able to provide a bond to pursue frivolous 
cases. Such under- and over-breadth of a statute's operation is not reasonable, fair, or 
equal. 
B. LIKE THE CURRENT BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES, THE 
STATUTE CONSIDERED IN ZAMORA VIOLATED DUE PROCESS. 
1. THE BOND STATUTE AT ISSUE IN ZAMORA AND THE BOND 
AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES AT ISSUE HERE VIOLATE 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
This Court has explained the meaning and reach of procedural due process: 
The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §I. Procedural 
due process claims are evaluated under a two-part test. The first question is 
''whether the [ complaining party] has been deprived of a protected interest" 
in property or liberty. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59, 
12 
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119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). If the court finds deprivation of a 
protected interest, we consider whether the procedures at issue comply with 
due process. Id. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Res/or. Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 48,299 P.3d 990. 
The requirement of a bond and an undertaking constitutes the deprivation of a 
property interest 14 without due process of law. So too does a requirement that a certain 
category of people seeking to pursue a cause of action for damages must-without any 
procedure for getting before or designating a judge-go through some unspecified 
process so a judge may determine if a bond and an undertaking might be waived or to 
engage in gross conjecture and speculation about the amount of a bond or undertaking. 
The deprivation is made even more egregious by the fact that the purpm1ed justification 
for the bizarre, discriminatory Bond and Undertaking Statutes is to deter frivolous 
lawsuits, yet a prospective plaintiff is not provided a hearing for a determination as to 
whether his or her claim falls within the class of cases (i.e., frivolous cases) against which 
~ the bond and undertaking requirements are supposedly aimed. That, in itself, is a taking 
in violation of due process. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1975) 
(in bank). 
In Zamora, the Court recognized that the suggested purpose of the bond statute 
was to protect "against frivolous and/or vexatious lawsuits," 635 P.2d at 81, 15 yet it failed 
14 
"( A] vested right of action is a property righty protected by the due process clause." 
Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987). Also, any amount required to be paid to 
pursue a cause of action is a "taking" within the meaning of the United States and Utah 
Due Process constitutional clauses. 
15 The Court in Zamora recognized the discriminatory nature of the bond statute, when it 
noted that "the danger of filing meritless actions also exists as to other kinds of lawsuits," 
13 
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to require a due process hearing during which a court would determine whether the 
prospective lawsuit was "frivolous and/or vexatious." Procedural due process was not 
even considered in Zamora-just as it was not considered in any of the ca"cs upnn which 
Zarnora relied:, see supra at 7, or in any of the cases rdying on 'Lamora for the dismissal 
of complaints because of a failure to file a bond. See supra at 4-5. 
2. THE BOND STATUTE AT ISSUE TN Z✓-11'-IORA ANI> TH}: 
BOND AND UNDERTAKING STATUTES AT ISSUE HERE 
VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. 
Both the due process clause of article I, section 7 and the open courts 
provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that 
litigants will have [their] day in court. 
A1iller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,138, 44 P.3d 663. There must be "access" 
and a 'Judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Beny, 717 P.2d at 675. 
In assessing claims of due process violations, a heightened scrutiny applies when 
there is an accompanying open courts clause challenge. 16 
[A]rticle I of the Utah Constitution, known as the "Declaration of Rights," 
contains affirmative guarantees of specific individual rights that are indeed 
fundamental. . . . [M]ost, if not all, of these rights have generated some 
form of heightened judicial scrutiny. . . . [T]his court has consistently 
app1 ied various forms of heightened review when article I rights are at 
issue. 
* * * 
63 5 P .2d at 81, yet it upheld the statute as facially constitutional without engaging in any 
equal protection analysis. 
16The Brief of Appellant, at 32, restated the general rule that "Utah courts apply a rational 
basis standard of review to claims alleging due process violations." The discussion 
following that statement focuses on the failure of the Bond and Undertaking Statutes to 
meet that test. However, rational basis is not the standard of review to be applied in cases 
involving open courts challenges. As is made clear in the Reply Brief of Appellant, at 
16-19, heightened scrutiny applies to the due process claims in this case because the 
Bond and Undertaking Statutes unreasonably burden the right of access to the courts. 
14 
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This court has wisely avoided the "analytical straitjacket" of federal equal 
protection analysis by avoiding a rigid test that dictates that some rights are 
v; fundamental and others are not. Instead, regarding article I, section 11 
rights, this court should examine in an individualized inquiry whether a 
legislative enactment denies a litigant "a remedy by due course of law" in 
order to deknnine whether article I, section 11 applies to lhe case at hand. 
1,,tiJ Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134 ,r,r 43, 50, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, CJ., 
dissenting) (writing for a majority of the Court) (citations omitted). 17 The test under the 
appropriate heightened standard of review is as follows: 
A legislative determination to interfere with, limit, or abrogate the 
availability of remedies for injuries to person, property, or reputation 
requires an important state interest and a rational means of 
implementation. The greater the intrusion upon the constitutionally 
protected interest, the greater and more explicit the state's reasons must be. 
It is necessary for the legislature, first, and this Court, second, to balance 
the weight of the governmental interest at stake against the countervailing 
imp01tance of the individual rights being compromised. 
Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 358 (Durham, CJ.) (emphasis added). 18 
Zamora and the trial court in this matter failed to apply that heightened scrutiny to 
~ the statutes at issue. They also failed to recognize that the requirement of any bond or 
undertaking was a due process ''taking." Had they done so, they would have been 
compelled to find a violation of the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. 
17 See also Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987,988 n.4 (Utah 1993); Condemarin v. Univ. 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("a majority of the Utah Supreme Court had agreed in the Condemarin 
opinion that analyzing the constitutionality of a state statute under the open courts 
rirovision implicated a heightened level of review."). 
8 Justice Zimmerman concurred with the section of Chief Justice Durham's opinion 
describing that rule, Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) and, as 
noted by Chief Justice Durham, ''the operation and effect of the equal protection test 
[Justice Stewart] describes is identical to the due process analysis" advocated by Chief 
Justice Durham's opinion. Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 356 n.6. 
15 
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